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ABSTRACT 
  Communities differ in both the bundle of amenities offered to residents and 
the implicit price of these amenities. Thus, households are faced with a choice of 
which bundle to select when they select their residence. This choice implies 
households make tradeoffs among the amenities; that is, the amenities are 
substitutes or complements. We focus on estimating the demand for one of the 
most important amenities -- public school quality. We use transaction prices from 
the housing market and the hedonic house price model to generate the implicit 
prices of community amenities. The median voter model is used to estimate the 
income and price elasticities of demand for educational quality. We find that the 
own price elasticity of demand for schooling is about -0.5 and the income elasticity 
of demand is about 0.5. New findings include estimates of a set of cross-price 
elasticities of demand for school quality. We find that a community’s income level, 
percentage white households, and level of public safety are substitutes for school 
quality.   3
1. INTRODUCTION 
  Estimating the demand for education is an important topic in economics. 
Primary and secondary education is an investment by parents in their children, and 
highly-educated children enter the labor force with higher human capital. A number 
of studies have investigated the determinants of the demand for schooling 
(Rubinfeld 1977; Jud and Watts 1981; Reid 1990; Brasington 2000). Surveying the 
literature, Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997) report that estimates of own price 
elasticities of demand for school quality generally range from –0.20 to –0.40. 
Bergstrom et al. (1982, p.1199) report a range of -0.25 to -0.50. Previous studies 
generally find income levels to be positively related to the demand for public 
schooling. Cross-elasticities of the demand for school quality with other community 
attributes have not been reported. 
   Our study furthers the empirical investigation of the demand for education, 
and it relies on information gathered from the housing market to specify the prices 
of local amenities. The most often used approach to estimate the demand for 
public school quality is through the median voter approach. A key requirement is 
that the price of educational quality be observed. We use the hedonic house price 
model (Rosen 1974) to determine this price, this approach feasible because public 
school quality is generally found to be an important determinant of the variation in 
house prices among communities (Haurin and Brasington 1996; Hite, et al. 2001; 
Downes and Zabel 2002; Figlio and Lucas 2004; Brasington and Haurin, 2006).   4
The hedonic model also can be used to measure the implicit prices of other local 
amenities and thus it allows us to estimate various cross-price elasticities of 
demand for school quality. 
  We find that the own price elasticity of demand for public schooling is about 
-0.5, the tax elasticity of demand is smaller, about -0.2, and the income elasticity of 
demand is 0.5. We estimate what appear to be the first measures of the cross-
price elasticities of demand between public school quality and other neighborhood 
attributes. Specifically, we find that school quality and living in high-income 
neighborhoods are substitutes, with a cross-price elasticity of about 0.2. A similar 
result is found for the cross-price elasticity with respect to the percentage white 
households, while the elasticity with respect to changes in the price of public safety 
is slightly smaller. 
 
2. THE MEDIAN VOTER APPROACH 
  A common approach to estimating the demand for a local public good or 
service such as the quality of public schools is the median voter model, whose 
empirical origins trace back to Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). In this model, the 
median voter is assumed to be decisive in determining a community’s consumption 
of a local public good or service. The median voter’s demand for quality public 
schooling is assumed to be a function of the price of schooling in a community and 
the median voter’s characteristics such as income.
1 The demand for schooling   5
should also be a function of the prices of other local amenities, thus incorporating 
substitutes and complements into the choice. 
  Often, data measuring the median value of household characteristics are 
available for local jurisdictions. Measures of the price of schooling are more difficult 
to identify, with the local tax price being the most common measure. However, it 
has long been recognized that the price of owner-occupied housing is influenced 
by the value of local amenities, including school quality and the level of safety, as 
well as community characteristics such as the level of income and the percentage 
of households that are white. Households, when making their locational choice, are 
clearly affected by the implicit market prices of these characteristics. Thus, while a 
household may prefer a locality that offers high quality public schools, that 
community could have high local taxes and/or a relatively high price of housing due 
to capitalization of school quality. The levels of other community attributes also are 
likely capitalized into house prices. A household thus must make tradeoffs among 
various bundles of local amenities, with each amenity priced in the housing market. 
Through the hedonic price model these implicit prices can be estimated. The 
availability of these implicit prices allows us to measure the own and cross-price 
elasticities of demand for schooling.  
  For example, consider a family with children that has a strong preference for 
high educational quality. To achieve a good outcome for their child, they prefer 
localities with good schools, but also value a safe environment, and perhaps good   6
peers for their child. These preferences will induce demands for local amenities, 
but if the amenities’ relative prices vary across communities, the household will 
substitute among them when maximizing utility. Whether safety and public school 
quality are substitutes or complements must be estimated empirically, with similar 
questions about the relationship of the demand for education and the income and 
racial composition of a community. 
  Does the rate of local amenity capitalization vary spatially? Brasington 
(2002) found that there is an inverse relationship between the elasticity of housing 
supply and capitalization rates. Specifically, he found that the capitalization of 
schooling and crime was weaker toward the edge of an urban area where housing 
supply elasticities and developer activity are greater. Thus, the “entry price” into a 
community offering a particular bundle of schooling and other amenities varies 
over space not only because the bundle differs but also because the implicit prices 
of a community’s amenities differ.  
  Goldstein and Pauly (1981) criticized the median voter approach, 
suggesting that because of imperfect Tiebout sorting (1956) the median voter 
should not be chosen based solely on income, and thus we estimate two versions 
of the model. The first is the traditional median voter approach and the second 
includes additional variables suggested by Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts (RSR 
1987) that mitigate Goldstein and Pauly’s “Tiebout bias”.  
  The median voter model to be estimated takes the following form:   7





γ3ik log (pik) + γ4 (zk) + ε1 
where s is school quality in the k-th community, y is median income, τ is the tax 
price, pi=s is the own price of school quality, the other pi are other goods’ prices, 
and z is a matrix of controls suggested by RSR (1987) to mitigate Tiebout bias.
2 In 
our analysis of substitutes and complements for school quality, we focus on 
community-level attributes such as community safety, income, and racial 
composition. In general, a household has the choice of many types and sizes of 
houses within a community and thus it need not face tradeoffs between school 
quality and house characteristics.  
  Using the hedonic price model, we derive implicit prices of housing 
attributes including those of the community such as school quality. The price 
function’s form is:  
2)   ln eHjk = βΛjk + δΦk + εjk,  
where the j-th household’s expenditure on housing is eHjk,  k represents the 
community selected by the household, Λ is a vector of house and lot 
characteristics, Φ represents community characteristics, and εjk is the error term. 
Following Brown and Rosen (1982), we use 2) to calculate the implicit prices p1, 
p2,...pn of the components of housing.
3  
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4. DATA AND IMPLEMENTATION 
  The primary source of data for the hedonic house price regressions is a 
record of single family home purchases that occurred during 1991 in Ohio 
(Amerestate 1991). We focus on non-farm urban properties and thus any house 
with lot size greater than two acres is deleted. Houses that transact at prices above 
$400,000 ($1991) are deleted as being unrepresentative, and houses that transact 
for less than $10,000 are deleted because they likely are either uninhabitable or a 
gift between family members. In addition, properties that are outliers in square feet 
of housing and garage size are deleted. Any community with less than 17 house 
transactions is deleted for fear of not producing a reliable hedonic estimates. Our 
sample consists of 40,116 houses in 134 communities, and the mean deflated 
house value is $73,107.
4 The School District Data Book (MESA Group, 1994), the 
Ohio Department of Education, and the Office of Criminal Justice Services of the 
State of Ohio provide the remainder of the explanatory variables. Variable means 
and standard deviations are in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
  The first step of the empirical analysis is to estimate the implicit prices of 
community characteristics. We estimate six hedonic house price equations 
covering six Ohio MSAs (Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, and 
Toledo). The estimation of multiple house price equations and a single demand 
equation identifies the demand equation from the house price hedonics (Brown   9
and Rosen 1982; Clark and Cosgrove 1990; Beron, Murdoch and Thayer 2001; 
Brasington and Hite 2005).  The dependent variable in the house price hedonic 
equation is the log of house price and the results are listed in Table 2.  
The hedonic estimations fit the data well and the explanatory variables have 
the expected signs. School quality is measured by the performance of a 
community’s students on a proficiency test that measures the percentage of 
students in each school district who pass all four sections of the statewide ninth 
grade proficiency exam. Its coefficient is positive and significant implying a positive 
implicit price. Median community income, the level of safety, and the percent of 
white residents in a community all have positive implicit prices. Income is 
significant in all six MSAs, safety is significant in two, and the percentage white is 
significant in five. The implicit prices of community amenity variables differ among 
communities within an MSA because they are functions of the average house 
value in the community, and they vary between MSAs for this reason and because 
their coefficients in the hedonic equation differ. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
The form of the median voter equation is specified in 1). The dependent 
variable is the natural log of the school quality measure. Explanatory variables 
include the community’s median household income, the tax price of local public 
goods
5, the own price of school quality, the prices of other community attributes, 
and the set of RSR variables to capture the sorting of residents to desired public   10
service levels. The RSR variables are a central city dummy variable and the 
proportion of new residents. The central city dummy variable represents the 
resident’s lack of choice among public good bundles; people may sort to central 
cities for reasons not related to public good bundles, such as access to work is 
more convenient or they face discrimination. The proportion of residents who have 
lived in the community for less than six years is chosen to represent newcomers. 
Because newcomers have moved in recently, the level of public services provided 
is probably similar to the level that induced the residents to move to the 
community.  
5. RESULTS 
  Means for the variables used in the demand estimation are presented in 
Table 3 and the regression results are shown in Table 4. Nearly all of the variables 
have statistically significant parameter estimates.  
[INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4] 
  Table 4 shows that the estimate of the price elasticity of demand for school 
quality ranges from -0.56 to -0.53 in the two specifications. The implication is that 
that greater the extent that school quality is capitalized into house prices, the lower 
the median voter’s demand for schooling. Households also pay for school quality 
through local taxes and higher taxes generate a demand response with elasticity 
estimates ranging from -0.05 to -0.11. Prior studies found tax price elasticities of 
demand for schooling between -0.20 and -0.40; however, they did not also control   11
for the impact of school quality on house prices (Reiter and Weichenrieder, 1997). 
The median voter model also yields an estimate of the income elasticity of demand 
for public school quality. We find the two estimates are 0.46 and 0.57, higher than 
that found all previous studies except Jud and Watts (1981), who find an income 
elasticity of 0.70. 
Our study is unique in that it analyzes the complements and substitutes for 
public schooling consumption. Our hedonic house price estimates indicate that 
high income in a community is valued as an amenity and it increases the price of 
housing. We also find that the quality of public schooling in a community and the 
presence of high-income neighbors are substitutes. The magnitude of the effect is 
relatively small, though, with elasticity estimates ranging from 0.18 to 0.20. We 
also find that public schooling and public safety are substitutes. Again, the 
elasticity is small, the estimate being 0.14. Finally, we find that public school quality 
and racial composition are substitutes, with the cross-price elasticity estimate 
being 0.14 to 0.16.  
   
6. CONCLUSION 
  Voting models argue that the demand for public goods and services can be 
determined from the choice of the median voter in a community. Communities 
differ in the cost to households of local public goods due to variations in both the 
tax price and their market prices as revealed through variations in house prices,   12
both within and across metropolitan areas. These variations imply that the median 
voter household must select among local amenity bundles. The demand 
relationships among the set of local public goods and services have not been 
estimated in prior studies. The cross-price elasticities with respect to public 
schooling are particularly interesting because of the importance of school quality in 
household locational choices.  
  The implicit prices of local amenities are generated from a hedonic house 
price estimation using Ohio data. The sample consists of house-level data drawn 
from a large number of communities in six MSAs. We use these prices to estimate 
own and cross-price elasticities of demand for public school quality. We find the 
price elasticity of demand for schooling is between -0.5 and -0.6 and the income 
elasticity of demand is about 0.5. The cross-price elasticity between public safety 
and school quality is about 0.15 suggesting they are weak substitutes. The cross-
price elasticity between the percentage white in a community and the quality of 
public schools also is about 0.15. Finally, we find the cross-price elasticity of 
demand between school quality and a household’s decision to locate in a high-
income neighborhood is about 0.2.  
  These results expand our understanding of the choices made by 
households when faced with an array of implicit prices for a vector of local public 
goods. While the cross-price elasticities simply reveal empirical relationships 
among a set of goods, they are plausible. For example, if the price of safety in a   13
locality is high, the median voter’s demand for school quality rises. Good schools 
may be viewed as a substitute for a safe environment for children. Similarly, if high-
income neighbors results in a good set of peers for children, then if the price of a 
high-income neighborhood is high (good peers are more expensive), the median 
voter’s demand for public school quality rises. Again, the estimated relationship is 
reasonable. 
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 Table  1 
 Variable Definitions and Means: Hedonic House Price Model 
 
Variable Name  Definition (Source)  Mean  
(Std. Dev.) 




Air Conditioning  Dummy variable for whether a house has air conditioning (1)  0.31 
(0.46) 




Lot Size  Size of lot, in thousands of square feet (1)  9.16 
(6.09) 
Age  Newness of a house = maximum age of a house in the sample 
in years (166) less the actual age of a house (1) 
122.60 
(23.82) 
Rooms  Number of rooms the house has (1)  5.93 
(1.14) 
Garage  Dummy variable for whether the house has a garage (1)  0.84 
(0.36) 
Full Bathrooms  Number of full bathrooms (1)  1.21 
(0.42) 




Deck  Dummy variable for whether the house has a deck (1)  0.09 
(0.29) 
Pool  Dummy variable for whether the house has a swimming pool (1)  0.01 
(0.11) 
Q2  Dummy variable for whether the house was sold in the second 
quarter of the year (1) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
Q3  Dummy variable for whether the house was sold in the third 
quarter of the year (1) 
0.27 
(0.45) 
Q4  Dummy variable for whether the house was sold in the fourth 
quarter of the year (1) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
Income  Average income of the community (school district) in thousands 





Percentage of students passing all four sections of the Ohio 9th 
grade proficiency test in 1990. The sections are math, reading, 
writing, and citizenship (3) 
31.60 
(17.10) 
Distance  Distance of centroid of the school district from the central 
business district of relevant urban area, in miles 
21.64 
(6.83) 
Safety  Inverse of the number of serious crimes per 1,000 community 
residents. Serious crimes include murder, forcible rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, motor vehicle theft, and arson (4) 
0.78 
(0.13) 




The number of observations is 33,876. Sources: (1) Amerestate (1991); (2) School District Data Book 
(MESA Group, 1994); (3) Ohio Department of Education; (4) Office of Criminal Justice Services (1994) 
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Table 2 
Hedonic House Price Regression 
Variable Akron  Cincinnati  Cleveland  Columbus  Dayton  Toledo 
Intercept  6.17**  8.04**  7.52** 7.49** 7.52** 5.95** 
Air Conditioning  0.08**  0.12**  0.05** 0.12** 0.13** 0.10** 
Fireplace  0.14**  0.16**  0.14** 0.19** 0.13** 0.16** 
Lot Size  0.002 0.016**  0.016** 0.034** 0.018** 0.032** 







Age  -0.001 0.007** 0.014**  -0.000  0.008** 0.028** 







Rooms  0.19**  0.06**  0.10** 0.17** 0.18** 0.03** 
Rooms Squared  -0.010** 0.001  -0.004** -0.007** -0.008** -0.011** 
Garage  0.22**  0.14**  0.21** 0.10** 0.26** 0.29** 
Full Bathrooms  0.16**  0.12**  0.12** 0.13** 0.11** 0.21** 
Part Bathrooms  0.11**  0.03**  0.13** 0.10** 0.11** 0.15** 
Deck  0.032 0.052**  0.070** 0.046** 0.092** 0.083** 
Pool  0.042 0.034 0.028  0.078 0.086** 0.058 
Q2  0.044**  0.051**  0.062** 0.072** 0.050**  0.016 
Q3  0.049**  0.058**  0.065** 0.070** 0.043**  0.023 
Q4  0.054**  0.063**  0.066** 0.070** 0.039**  0.003 
Log Proficiency 
Test Score 
0.30** 0.11** 0.14**  0.12** 0.072** 0.088 
Income  0.0049**  0.0033**  0.0058** 0.0057** 0.0057** 0.0039** 
Distance  0.004 0.011**  0.011** 0.028** 0.018**  0.014 
Safety  0.17  0.51**  0.14**  0.02 0.06 0.22 
Percent White  1.76** 0.16* 0.33** 0.63** 0.51**  0.20 
Number of 
observations 
2550  5240  13963  7602 6879 3882 
Adjusted  R-Sq.  0.68  0.71  0.66 0.60 0.70 0.74 
Parameter estimates are shown. **significant at .05, *significant at .10, otherwise statistically insignificant. 
Dependent variable is the natural log of House Price.  
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Table 3 
Variable Definitions and Means: Median Voter Model 
Variable     Means 
Own Price: Implicit price of school quality, in dollars  185 
Income: The median community income, in thousands of dollars  39.1 
Price of Income: Implicit price of community income, in dollars  272 
Price of Race: Implicit price of the percent of community residents 
who are white, in dollars 
26.91 
Price of Safety: Implicit price of lack of violent crimes, in dollars  10.35 
Tax Price: House value multiplied by the community property tax 
rate, divided by taxable property valuation per pupil 
0.03 
Central City: A dummy variable, 1 if central city  0.03 
Newcomer: Proportion of residents who have lived in the 
community for less than six years 
0.45 
Number of observations is 135 communities (school districts).  
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Table 4 
Demand for School Quality 
Variable  School Quality School Quality 
Log Own Price  -0.56** -0.53** 
Log Median Income  0.57** 0.46** 
Log Price of Income  0.18** 0.20** 
Log Price of Race  0.14* 0.16** 
Log Price of Safety  0.14** 0.14** 
Log Tax Price  -0.05 -0.11** 
Central City  - -0.23* 
Newcomer  - 0.85** 
Intercept  0.86* 0.40 
Adjusted R-square  0.77  0.79 
** = significant at 0.05, * = significant at 0.10. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of School Quality and 
the number of observations is 135 communities (school 
districts). 
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ENDNOTES   
                                                           
1 Data sets do not identify the median voter, so researchers must find proxies for 
the values of the explanatory variables of the median voter. 
2 Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts (1987) show that household sorting can bias 
estimates of demand elasticities in both micro level and aggregate data. They 
identify variables that are likely to affect sorting but not demand (p. 432) such as 
the percentage of recent movers and a variable that indicates the amount of 
jurisdictional choice that is available. 
3 The implicit prices are the partial derivatives of house price with respect to each 
house characteristic. Here they equal the coefficient of an explanatory variable 
multiplied by the house value. Recent examples of the calculation of the implicit 
price of characteristics from house price hedonics include Brasington (2000), 
Beron, Murdoch and Thayer (2001), and Brasington and Hite (2005). 
4 Dollar denominated variables are deflated (1991 base year) using cost of living 
estimates at the metropolitan statistical area level (ACCRA 1991, 1992).  
5 The tax price is defined to be house value multiplied by the community property 
tax rate, divided by taxable property valuation per pupil. The taxable property 
value per pupil depends on multiple factors exogenous to the median voter such 
as the number of pupils in the community and the amount of nonresidential 
property. 